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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
What determines the structure of world trade? Two main explanations have
been put forth (see, e.g., Helpman, 1990). The ﬁrst one highlights the role
of relative cost diﬀerences between countries: a country exports the goods
that it is able to produce at relatively lower costs. The uneven international
distribution of technology (Ricardian model) and/or relative factor endow-
ments (Heckscher-Ohlin model) would then generate those diﬀerences (Dixit
and Norman, 1980). The second explanation stresses the role of increasing
returns to scale and market structure: a country exports the goods for which
it oﬀers a relatively large local demand. Strategic interactions and product
diﬀerentiation support such outcomes, known as the “home market eﬀect”
(henceforth HME; Krugman, 1980). Indeed, while some kind of imperfect
competition is needed for a sector to exhibit a HME, both oligopoly and
monopolistic competition generally serve the purpose (Feenstra et al., 2000;
Head et al., 2002).
As shown by Helpman and Krugman (1985), the two explanations are
not incompatible. Yet, the ﬁrst seems better ﬁt for explaining intersectoral
trade between somewhat diﬀerent countries, whereas the second looks more
suited to account for intrasectoral trade between similar countries. In par-
ticular, it has been argued that the former would explain North-South trade,
whereas the latter would account for North-North trade, together more than
80 per cent of world trade ﬂows. Nonetheless, the relative merits of the two
explanations are still debated, as highlighted by recent empirical works (see,
e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003). The reason being that relative costs
matter also for North-North ﬂows, and product diﬀerentiation is relevant
also for North-South ﬂows. Overall, however, as pointed out by Helpman
(1998):
“adding product diﬀerentiation improves the ﬁt between the-
ory and data. Since the inherent richness of models with product
diﬀerentiation has not yet been much explored, they also carry
the potential of providing even better explanations when sub-
jected to further analysis”.
One example of how theory still lags behind empirics is the investiga-
tion of the HME by Davis and Weinstein (2003). Their point of departure
is the model by Krugman (1980), which portrays a two-country economy
with one factor of production (labor) and two sectors. One sector sup-
plies a freely-traded homogeneous good under constant returns to scale and
2perfect competition. The other one produces a horizontally diﬀerentiated
good under increasing returns and monopolistic competition à la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). For each diﬀerentiated variety, ﬁxed and marginal input re-
quirements are constant and international trade is hampered by frictional
(‘iceberg’) trade costs. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas across the two goods
and symmetric CES between varieties of the diﬀerentiated good. Due to
the ﬁxed input requirement, in equibrium the larger country supports the
production of a more than proportionate number of diﬀerentiated varieties,
thus being a net exporter of this good (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). What
is crucial is that, in a Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin world, the HME would
not arise. Speciﬁcally, when there are trade costs, increases in market size
map into a less than proportional increase of industry, since a fraction of
the additional demand is satisﬁed by imports from the rest of the world.
All this suggests to compare the predictive power of the two alternative ex-
planations by estimating the impacts of aggregate demand on the output
of diﬀerent sectors. A more than proportional causation from demand to
supply would support the HME as a driving force for specialization and
trade, whereas a less than proportional causation would support relative
cost and/or endowment driven patterns.
The problem with applying the above idea to real data is that Krugman’s
clear-cut result has been derived in a two-country set-up only and, thus, need
not hold in a multi-country world. This point has been recently emphasized
by Head and Mayer (2004):
“How do we construct demand measures in the presence of
more than two countries? Indeed how does one even formulate
the home market eﬀect hypothesis? The ratios and shares of the
theoretical formulations neglect third country eﬀects.”
As a ﬁrst interesting solution to this intellectual deadlock, Davis and
Weinstein (2003) construct an index (called ‘IDIODEM’) of the demand
facing producers in a certain country that takes into account not only lo-
cal demand but also some measure of demand from neighbouring contries.
Then, by analogy with the two-country case, they conjecture that a larger
than one estimate of the elasticity of output to the index would provide ev-
idence in favor of the HME. Albeit empirically appealing and a natural ﬁrst
step, the IDIODEM index is not derived from clear theoretical foundations.
Thus, unlike the authors seem to argue, its regression coeﬃcient is hard to
interpret.
The aim of the present paper is to present a theory-based analysis of
3the observable implications of Krugman’s model when extended to many
countries. In particular, our main objective is twofold.
First, we assess which results survive the extension. We show that the
so-called ‘dominant market eﬀect’ and the ‘magniﬁcation eﬀect’ (see, e.g.,
Head et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2003) remain valid, thus suggesting that
several of the underlying mechanisms are quite robust. Yet, we also show
that the HME itself may not arise in the general setting. This is due to the
fact that, once ‘third country eﬀects’ are taken into account, an increase in
one country’s expenditure share may well map into a less than proportionate
increase in its output share as other countries ‘drain away’ some ﬁrms. In
more extreme cases, an increase in the expenditure share may even lead to
a decrease in industry share (‘home market eﬀect shadow’), thus suggesting
that the output response to increasing demand may be an inappropriate
instrument to detect the empirical relevance of product diﬀerentiation and,
more generally, imperfect competition as determinants of trade ﬂows.
Second, since the ‘Davis-Weinstein conjecture’ is not generally supported
by the extension of Krugman’s model to a multi-country set-up, we pro-
pose an alternative, theory-based test. In particular, we derive an estimat-
ing speciﬁcation in which the regressand variable is ‘industry distribution’
whereas the regressors are a spatial aggregate of ‘country sizes’ and a mea-
sure of ‘accessibility’. Albeit slightly similar to a gravity speciﬁcation (and
related to the IDIODEM index), the null hypothesis is quite diﬀerent from
the one used in the empirical literature so far. In so doing, we move away
from the deﬁnition in terms of disproportionate causation from demand to
supply, which allows us to circumvent the problems highlighted in the fore-
going.
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst presents the multi-
country extension of the model by Krugman (1980) and describes the equi-
librium. The second deﬁnes the HME with many countries, both in a static
and a dynamic way. The third relates the multi-country HME to the con-
cepts of market potential and market size. The fourth discusses the eﬀects
of geography and presents a methodology that allows to test the HME in a
multi-country world. The ﬁfth ﬁnally concludes.
2 The model
The world economy consists of M countries, indexed by i =1 ,2,...,M.
Country i hosts an exogenously given mass of Li consumers, each of them
supplying one unit of labor inelastically. Hence, both the world population
4and the world endowment of labor are given by L =
PM
i=1 Li. Labor is the
only factor of production and it is assumed to be internationally immobile.
2.1 Preferences and technologies
Preferences are deﬁned over a homogeneous good and a set of varieties of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good. The preferences of a typical resident of













In the above expressions Hi is the consumption of the homogeneous good,
di(ω) is the consumption of variety ω and Ωi is the set of varieties available
in country i. The parameter σ > 1 measures both the own- and cross-price
elasticities of demand for any variety.
The production of the homogeneous good is carried out by perfectly com-
petitive ﬁrms under constant returns to scale. The unit labor requirement
is set to one by choice of units. Trade in the homogeneous good is free. The
production of any variety of the diﬀerentiated good takes place under inter-
nal increasing returns to scale by a set of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms.
This set is endogenously determined by free entry and exit. We denote by
ni the mass of ﬁrms located in country i and by N =
P
i ni the total mass
of ﬁrms in the world economy. The production technology of each variety
requires a ﬁxed and a constant marginal labor requirements labeled F and c
respectively. Increasing returns to scale and costless product diﬀerentiation
yield a one-to-one relation between ﬁrms and varieties, so we will use the
two terms interchangeably. As to trade barriers, the international trade of
any variety incurs ‘iceberg’ trade costs. Speciﬁcally, τij > 1 units have to
be shipped from country i to country j for one unit to reach its destination.
2.2 Market equilibrium
In the homogeneous sector, perfect competition implies pricing at marginal
cost, which, given the normalization of the unit input coeﬃcient, is equal to
the wage. Free trade then generates equalization across all countries. More
precisely, this is the case as long as some homogeneous production takes
5place in all countries, which we assume to hold from now on. The formal
conditions for this to happen are given in Appendix 1 and require that the
expenditure share µ on the manufactured good is not too large (see (48)).
We choose the homogeneous good as the numéraire, which implies that not
only its price but also the wage equals one in all countries.
T u r n i n gt ot h ed i ﬀerentiated sector, the symmetric set-up of the model
implies that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms diﬀer only by the country where they are
located. Accordingly, to simplify notation, we will drop the variety label
from now on. Then, the maximization of utility (1) yields the following


















is the CES price index in country j. Expression (3) reveals the essence of
monopolistic competition: ﬁrms do not interact directly but through changes
in aggregate variables, i.e. Pj.
Let xij be the amount of production by the typical ﬁrm in country i.
Due to trade costs, the ﬁrm has to produce xij = dijτij units to satisfy ﬁnal
























Since, due to free entry and exit, proﬁts have to be zero in equilibrium, (5)







j dijτij is total ﬁrm production inclusive of the amount of
output lost in transit. Hence, we can write the market clearing condition
















,j =1 ,2...,M, (9)
where φik ≡ τ1−σ
ik is a measure of trade freeness valued one when trade is
free (i.e. τik =1 ) and limiting zero when trade is inhibited (i.e. τik →∞ ).
In (9) we have used the fact that, since proﬁts are zero, in equilibrium
expenditures equal labor income (Ej = Lj).
Multiplying both sides of (9) by ni and summing up across countries,
we get N = µL/Fσ: in equilibrium the world mass of ﬁr m si sc o n s t a n ta n d
proportional to world population. This allows us to rewrite (9) in terms of
shares. In particular, after deﬁning θi ≡ Li/L and λi ≡ ni/N,t h em a r k e t





=1 ,j =1 ,2,...,M. (10)
2.3 Matrix notation
An interior equilibrium is characterized by M conditions, given by (10). The
ﬁrm shares λi’s are M endogenous unknowns whereas the expenditure shares
θi as well as the trade freeness measures φij’s are exogenous parameters.
From now on, we set φii =1meaning that trade is free within countries.
We also set φij = φji meaning that trade ﬂows between any given pair of
countries face the same trade costs in both directions. Since (10) describes a
system of linear equations in the endogenous variables λi, we make notation
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7where λT1 = θT1 =1(in what follows, 1 stands for the vector whose
components are all equal to one).
Using these deﬁnitions, the M equilibrium conditions (10) can be ex-
pressed in matrix notation as follows:
Φdiag(Φλ)−1θ = 1. (11)
In order to simplify some of the subsequent developments, problem (11) is
best conveniently decomposed into an outer and an inner step.T h eo u t e r
step consists in ﬁnding ϕ such that
Φϕ = 1. (12)
Note that this problem depends on the trade cost matrix Φ only and is hence
independent of the expenditure distribution θ.I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s s u m e
that distance between countries is measured by the euclidian norm so that
Φ is positive deﬁnite (see Appendix 2 for more details). Hence, there is a
unique ϕ = Φ−11 satisfying equation (12). The inner step consists then in
ﬁnding λ∗ such that
diag(Φλ∗)−1θ = ϕ. (13)
Note that this inner step involves both Φ (directly and indirectly via ϕ)a n d
θ. Equation (13) can also be expressed as
θ =d i a g ( ϕ)Φλ∗. (14)
If we denote by fij the cofactor of φij and by |Φ| the determinant of Φ,t h e













which is simply the i-th row of expression (14).
2.4 Spatial equilibrium: existence and characterization







xi =1 ,x i > 0, ∀i
¾
.
1Note that, since ∆ is contained in an M − 1 dimensional hyperplane, its topological
interior is empty in R
M.
8We assume that θ ∈ ri(∆) so that all countries have at least some expendi-
ture share. Furthermore, we focus on interior equilibria only, i.e. equilibria
in which λ∗
i > 0 for all countries i =1 ,2,...M. Hence, λ∗ ∈ ri(∆).
A necessary condition for an interior solution to exist can be obtained










where the inequality results from φij ∈ (0,1) and where the last equality is
due to the fact that the λ∗
j’s sum up to one. This implies that
ϕi > θi,i =1 ,2,...,M (16)
is a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium to exist. Provided such
an equilibrium exists, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms is given by
λ∗ =( d i a g ( ϕ)Φ)
−1 θ, (17)








Since Φ is a symmetric matrix, fij = fji holds for all i and j. Observe that
(18) shows that the relationship between λ∗ and θ is linear for any interior
solution. Finally, as shown in Appendix 3, every interior equilibrium is
locally stable in the sense that no small group of ﬁrms has any incentive to
deviate from the country where it is located.
It is readily veriﬁed that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the





θj > 0,i =1 ,2,...,M. (19)
Because µ>0, we can combine this with condition (48) for factor price






θj > 0,i =1 ,2,...,M. (20)
In what follows, we assume that (20) always holds.
9Since the sum of the left-hand sides of (19) is 1, inequality (19) guarantees
that λ∗
i ∈ (0,1) for all i. Note that this condition (19) depends on both Φ
and θ, so that the eﬀects of “geography” (i.e. of Φ) and of “expenditure”
(i.e. of θ) cannot be clearly separated. Due to the linearity of the model,
any interior equilibrium (18) is unique if it exists. Thus, we have shown the
following:
Proposition 1 (existence, uniqueness and stability) A unique and lo-
cally stable interior equilibrium with factor price equalization exists if and
only if (20) holds.
Condition (16), although only necessary and not suﬃcient, allows to
separate partly the impact of “geography” from the impact of “expenditure”.















for all indices i and j, where the last inequality results from (16). Therefore,











and, hence, by deﬁnition
λ∗
i(θ) < ϕi,i =1 ,2,...,M (21)
or λ∗ < ϕ in vector notation. Conditions (16) and (21) can be interpreted
as follows. Consider a given geography Φ (hence the ϕi are given). Under
autarky (i.e. Φ is equal to the identity matrix Id), λ∗ = θ, so that condition
(21) reduces to condition (16). Hence, condition (16) is the least stringent
necessary condition on the couple (θ,Φ) to be met for an interior equilibrium
to arise (note that the condition ϕi > 0 involves only Φ and not θ). This is
because, once there is some trade (ﬁnite trade costs), at least one country
i is such that λ∗
i > θi, so condition (21) is more stringent. Condition (21)
captures the trade-oﬀ between centrality (low values of ϕi) and expenditures
(high values of θi). When a country is centrally located, it must have a
“disproportionally smaller expenditure share” for an interior equilibrium to
be feasible. On the other hand, when a country is remotely located (large
value of ϕi), it can have a large expenditure θi that may be compatible with
an interior equilibrium.
The impact of geography is clear from the following proposition, the
proof of which is relegated to Appendix 4.
10Proposition 2 (Magniﬁcation Eﬀect) Consider a given expenditure dis-
tribution θ ∈ ri(∆). When trade is suﬃciently restricted, there always exists
an interior equilibrium, whereas when trade becomes suﬃciently free, such
an equilibrium never exists.
Proposition 2 shows that freer trade leads to a more uneven spatial distri-
bution of the diﬀerentiated sector. This is sometimes called “magniﬁcation
eﬀect” (see Head et al., 2002; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
3D e ﬁning the multi-country HME
The idea that market size matters for the location of industry dates at least
back to the ‘early days of gravity theory’ (see, e.g., Harris, 1954; Tinbergen,
1962). During the 1980s, new trade theory re-discovered the importance
of market size for explaining the pattern of industry location and trade.
A l t h o u g ht h ec o n c e p to fH M Eh a sb e e nw i d e l yu s e di nb o t ht h e o r ya n d
applications since then, we still lack a clear and general deﬁnition of what
exactly a HME is in a multi-country context. In Krugman’s (1980, p. 955)
own words, in sectors characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competi-
tion “countries will tend to export those kinds of products for which they
have relatively large domestic demand”. This property is neatly implied by
two-country models. Indeed, Helpman and Krugman (1985) show that, in
a two-country economy, the larger country hosts a more than proportional
share of the monopolistically competitive industry. Given preferences that
are homothetic and identical across countries, such a pattern of production
makes the larger country a net exporter of the diﬀerentiated good.
The disproportional positive causation from demand to supply has be-
come the standard deﬁnition of the HME (see, e.g., Head et al., 2002).
Thus, in identifying the multi-country HME, we adopt such deﬁnition and
we generalize it from both a static (i.e., cross-sectional) and a dynamic (i.e.,
time-series) point of view.
3.1 Static deﬁnition
Assume that countries i and j host an industry share that is proportional
to their expenditure share, which can be expressed as follows:
λ∗
i = kiθi and λ∗
j = kjθj,
where ki and kj are positive coeﬃcients. In the presence of a HME, the
disproportionate positive causation from demand to supply requires that

















This suggests the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 (Static Home Market Eﬀect) The monopolistically com-
petitive industry of country i exhibits a Static Home Market Eﬀect (hence-








, ∀j =1 ,...,M such that θi ≥ θj, (22)
where the inequality in (22) is strict if and only if θi > θj.
In what follows, we say that the global economy exhibits a SHME if
condition (22) holds for all countries i =1 ,2,...M. Assuming, without loss













Stated diﬀerently, under a SHME there is no ‘industrial leap-frogging’ in the
global economy, in the sense that smaller countries always host a relatively
smaller share of the monopolistically competitive industry. This implies that
the ordering in terms of industry shares respects the ‘natural’ ordering in
terms of countries’ economic sizes. Note that conditions (22) and (23) do not
rely on changes in expenditure shares and, therefore, can be observed at any
given moment in time. Thus, provided we possess some convenient measure
of θ and λ, (22) and (23) can be checked with the help of cross-sectional
data only. This explains why we refer to it as the static HME.
3.2 Dynamic deﬁnition
A dynamic deﬁnition of the HME is often presented as an alternative in the
literature dealing with two countries only.2 It builds on the observation that
changes in expenditure shares map into more than proportional changes in
industry shares. While the SHME relates to the cross-sectional dispropor-
tionality between two countries at the same time, the dynamic home market
2Note that the ‘dynamic’ deﬁnition is also frequently used in the empirical literature.
For example, Davis and Weinstein (2003, p. 7) deﬁne the HME as “a more than one-for-
one movement of production in response to ideosyncratic demand”.
12eﬀect relates to the time-series disproportionality between two periods in the
same country.
Head et al. (2002) have shown that the static and dynamic deﬁnitions are
equivalent in the symmetric 2×2-setting, thus making the choice immaterial
in this case. Not surprisingly, things are no longer that simple in the multi-
country world with an arbitrary trade cost matrix.
We may derive the dynamic deﬁnition in a way analogous to that used
in the previous section. Assume that country i hosts an industry share at

















so that the new industry share is given by (λ∗
i)
t+1 = kt+1θt+1
i .I n t h e
presence of a dynamic HME, the disproportionate positive causation from













































This suggests the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 (Dynamic Home Market Eﬀect) The monopolistically com-
petitive industry of country i exhibits a Dynamic Home Market Eﬀect (hence-









where dθ is a small variation satisfying dθi > 0 and
P
jdθj =0 .
It is of interest to note that the DHME requires that the industry share
λ∗
i of country i be suﬃciently elastic with respect to the expenditure share
13θi, which clearly captures the idea that changes in expenditure map into dis-
proportionate changes in industry. Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium industry





















Condition (26) reveals that the DHME, as deﬁned above, need not hold for
some variations dθ when trade costs are not pairwise symmetric across all
countries. This is because the equilibrium industry shares λ∗ are linear in
expenditure shares θ, which implies that for any distribution θ ∈ int(∆),
there exists a variation dθ such that (26) is violated.3
Proposition 3 (‘Third country eﬀects’) For every distribution θ ∈ ri(∆),
there exists a perturbation dθ,w i t hdθi > 0 and
P
j dθj =0 , such that the
disproportionate causation from demand to supply does not hold.
Proof. Because λ∗
i > 0, θi > 0,a n ddθi > 0, a necessary condition for
(25) to hold is that dλ∗
i be strictly positive. However, by linearity,
dλ∗
i = λ∗







(cij − cii)dθj (27)
where the cij are coeﬃcients as given in (18), and where the last inequality
stems from the constraint that the perturbations sum up to one. Two cases
may arise: (i) when trade costs are pairwise symmetric across regions, it is
easily veriﬁed that cij = c for all i 6= j. Hence,
X
j6=i
(cij − cii)dθj =( cii − c)dθi,
which is positive when cii >c . That this always holds, and that a DHME
arises in this case, is shown later (see, e.g., expression (43)); (ii) when trade
3Note, however, that (26) may hold in models with non-linear relationships between θ
and λ
∗. Further, (26) may be useful for empirical purposes, especially because in general
all expenditure shares vary between two time periods.
14costs are not pairwise symmetric, we can always ﬁnd perturbations dθj such
that (27) is negative, in which case the DHME does not hold for all per-
turbations satisfying dθi > 0 and
P
j dθj =0 .I t i s s u ﬃcient to note that
in the general case minj{cij} < maxj{cij} a n dt h a ta tl e a s to n edθj, j 6= i,
must be strictly negative.
Proposition 3 shows that the disproportionate causation from demand
to supply does not trivially hold in the multi-country setting, which suggests
that measuring the HME in this way requires us to be very careful. Indeed,
all expenditure shares usually change between two periods in the data, so
that a ‘HME shadow’ may arise, in the sense that even if country i gains
expenditure, it may actually gain a less than proportional industry share if
another country j also gains some expenditure. In some cases, such eﬀect
m a yb es os t r o n gt h a tc o u n t r yi simply looses industry, despite its increase
in expenditure, as argued in Proposition 3.
To illustrate this result, consider the following example. Assume that



































Assume further that all countries have the same initial expenditure share,
i.e., that θ =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3). Then when the variation dθ is e.g. given
by dθ =( ²,−9²,8²),w i t has u ﬃciently small ²>0,c o u n t r y1 gains some


























Note that, as shown by dθ,c o u n t r y3 displays a much stronger “dynamic”
HME (it gains eight times as much expenditure than country 1), which can
thus drain some industry from country 1, even though this country actually
gains some expenditure.
Condition (26) does not necessarily hold in our model, because we have
no information a priori on the “perturbation” dθ. In order to obtain a
15tractable speciﬁcation that accounts for the cross-eﬀects, we can restrict
ourselves to the case of an exogenous expenditure shock dEi for country
i only. Indeed, suppose that country i’s expenditure changes from Ei to
















Stated diﬀerently, the expenditure shares of all countries other than i vary
in the same way, which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis of (25) and (26). Some









∀ j 6= i, (29)









































































The ﬁrst term of the left-hand side of (30) is the direct eﬀect of the change
in dEi, while the second term captures all indirect eﬀects. As shown in








holds under fairly general assumptions. In what follows, we refer to (31) as
the direct DHME. Using (31), the second term of the right-hand side of (30)
is positive, thus implying that the indirect eﬀect ampliﬁes the direct DHME.4
4One should further note that, since this impact is stronger for larger values of θi,w e
may say that the direct DHME is ampliﬁed within countries exhibiting a greater SHME.
16The next proposition establishes that each country exhibits a DHME at any
interior equilibrium with respect to an exogenous expenditure shock dEi.
Proposition 4 An increase in country i’s expenditure (i.e. dEi > 0 and
dEj =0 , ∀j 6= i) leads to a direct DHME and a DHME, as given by (25),
in country i.















The ﬁrst terms on the LHS is positive from (31), the second term is negative

















It should be ﬁnally noted, however, that Proposition 4 neglects the possible
cross-eﬀects when workers move from one country to another or when more
than one expenditure shock occurs. As shown previously, in such a case the
DHME need not arise as the ‘HME shadow’ may be too strong.
4 The impact of market size
In the multi-country setting with a general trade cost matrix, three distinct
eﬀects enter the HME: the market size eﬀect (attraction), the hub eﬀect
(accessibility) and the competition eﬀect (repulsion). The interplay between
attraction and accessibility are central to gravity models and spatial inter-
action theory (see, e.g., Harris, 1954; Smith, 1975), and have been recently
‘rediscovered’ in international trade and economic geography (see, e.g., Fu-
jita et al., 1999; Head and Mayer, 2004). One deﬁning characteristic of the
general equilibrium models of the latter ﬁelds is that the repulsive nature of
price competition is now explicitly accounted for.5
Following Head and Mayer (2004), we can deﬁne the real market potential










5Given constant elasticity of demand and no strategic interactions among ﬁrms, some
authors prefer the name ‘market crowding eﬀect’ to ‘competition eﬀect’ (see, e.g., Baldwin
et al., 2003; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
17This can be expressed more concisely in matrix notation as follows:
RMP = Φdiag(Φλ)−1θ,
which is simply the RHS of (11) and, therefore, equal to 1 at any interior
equilibrium. Stated diﬀerently, any interior equilibrium is such that the real
market potential across all regions is equalized.6 Observe that the numerator
of (33) stands for accessibility to consumers’ demand, whereas the denomi-
nator is accessibility to producers’ supply. Whereas the former captures the
attractivity of country i, the latter stands for the degree of competition and,
hence, reduces the RMP.
Using (33), the real market potential diﬀerence between countries i and
j is given by









Expression (34) can be used in order to easily highlight the presence of the
SHME when trade costs are pairwise symmetric across countries, i.e., when
we “sterilize” the hub eﬀect and focus on the market size eﬀect only. Assume
that φij = φ,f o ra l li 6= j, so that geographical diﬀerences between countries
no longer matter. In this case, expression (34) boils down to
RMPi − RMPj =
(1 − φ)θi
λi + φ(1 − λi)
−
(1 − φ)θj
λj + φ(1 − λj)
,










Because φ < 1,w h e nθi > θj condition (35) can only hold when λi > λj,










This reveals the presence of the SHME, as given by Deﬁnition 1. Expression
(34) further allows us to show the following:
6We know that (33) is constant for any (interior) equilibrium distribution λ
∗.H e n c e ,
ﬁrms have no incentive to relocate because the RMP is the same everywhere. Yet, the
RMP diﬀers across countries for oﬀ-equilibrium distributions. In this case, ﬁrms relocate
from low to high RMP countries, which is the usual adjustment dynamics used in new
economic geography (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002).
18Proposition 5 (Dominant Market Eﬀect) For every country i,t h e r e
exists an expenditure share θ
sup
i < 1 such that λ∗
i =1for all θi ≥ θ
sup
i .
Proof. In order for country i to host all monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms in equilibrium
RMPi − RMPj ≥ 0 ∀j (36)
must hold at the distribution λ∗
i =1and λ∗
j =0for j 6= i. Stated diﬀerently,
country i oﬀers a higher RMP than all other countries when λ∗
i =1 ,w h i c h
implies that no ﬁrm has any incentives to change its current location. Some













Clearly, when θi =1 , θj =0for j 6= i, so that condition (37) holds as a
strict inequality. The desired result then follows by continuity of both sides
of (37) with respect to θ.
Proposition 5 shows that a region with a suﬃciently large expenditure
share attracts the whole mobile industry. In accordance with classical lo-
cation theory, we will call such a region a dominant market (Weber, 1909).
Note that expression (37) is highly reminiscent of a well-known result in loca-
tion theory, namely the Majority Theorem (Witzgall, 1964). When country i
hosts an expenditure share that is larger than some weighted average of the
expenditure shares of the other countries, all mobile ﬁrms will agglomer-











As shown in Appendix 6, the link with Witzgall’s Majority Theorem can
then be explicitly established, provided a particular metric is used. To the
best of our knowledge, this interesting connection between location theory
and trade theory has been overlooked until now.
Note also that the pairwise symmetric setting allows to neatly illustrate
the magniﬁcation eﬀect highlighted in Proposition 2. To see that freer trade
always exacerbates the HME and maps into more extreme spatial structures,
we compute the equilibrium industry shares (18) when φij = φ for all i 6= j:
λ∗
i =












1+( M − 1)φ
1 − φ
(θi − θj). (38)
Since the coeﬃcient of θi − θj is increasing in φ, a decrease in trade costs
necessarily exacerbates the HME.
5 The impact of geography
The results derived in the previous section show that the assumption of pair-
wise symmetric trade costs across all countries constitutes a special case,
which gives rise to quite particular results. Yet, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the only setting that has been investigated in a multi-country
framework until now.7 For instance, although Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 333)
acknowledge that “the very simple form of (38) is not robust”, they do not
dig any deeper into the properties of the multi-country HME with asymmet-
ric trade costs. This is most likely due to the fact that the hub eﬀect plays an
i m p o r t a n tr o l ew i t hm o r eg e n e r a lt r a d ec o s ts p e c i ﬁcations and signiﬁcantly
complicates the analysis. That several interesting results can nevertheless
be established when “geography really matters” is argued in the remainder
of this section.
Krugman (1993) highlights the existence of the so-called ‘hub eﬀect’
with the help of a three-country model. Yet, the HME literature has, to the
best of our knowledge, not investigated this issue any further. This is quite
puzzling because, as stated by Fujita and Mori (1996, p. 93), “agglomeration
economies and the hub eﬀect of transport nodes interplay in the making of
major cities”. As argued in this section, such a ‘neglect’ may be due to
t h ef a c tt h a tt h eh u be ﬀect is very elusive and, therefore, especially hard to
deﬁne clearly in the multi-country context.
5.1 Deﬁning the hub eﬀect
In what follows, we “sterilize” the market size eﬀect and focus on the hub
eﬀect only. Since there are many meaningful ways to deﬁne the hub eﬀect,
we focus in what follows on both deﬁnitions that draw upon the freeness of
7This also shows that the two-country case, which is always pairwise symmetric by
deﬁnition, is very particular and that the results obtained in such setting should be ex-
trapolated with great caution.
20trade only, and deﬁnitions that combine freeness of trade with expenditure.8
Let us start with measures that build on the freeness of trade only (i.e.,
exclusively on the φij). We know from (16) that
ϕi > 0,i =1 ,2,...,M (39)
must hold for an interior equilibrium to exist for at least some expenditure
distributions θ. The case in which condition (39) does not hold can be seen
as a situation in which the freeness of trade is such that the distribution of
economic activity is always strongly skewed towards some countries, thus
leaving some others empty. This is likely to happen when (i) some countries
have a signiﬁcant locational advantage (e.g., access to the sea) or disad-
vantage (e.g., being landlocked; see Gallup et al., 1999); or (ii) when some
countries have a restrictive trade policy. In such a situation the expenditure
distribution is dominated by the freeness of trade in the sense that there is
no way the industry can be spread across all countries.
Although the use of ϕi to measure the hub eﬀect has its merits, it is
clearly too narrow a view. A less restrictive deﬁnition of the hub eﬀect may
be based on the following observation. If expenditure was equally spread
across all countries, every country would host the same share of the industry
when φij = φ for all i 6= j. Hence, when θi =1 /M for all i,d i ﬀerences in
equilibrium industry shares λ∗
i a r ep u r e l yd r i v e nb yd i ﬀerences in the φij’s,
i.e. by diﬀerences in the countries’ respective freeness of trade. Assuming
that expenditure is equally split across all countries, the equilibrium industry

















w h i c hd e p e n do nt h eφij only. Expression (40) reveals that regions with a
low value of ϕj (i.e. regions that oﬀer on average a good access to markets)
have a strong impact on country i’s industry share, whereas countries with
a high value of ϕj (i.e. regions that oﬀer on average a bad access to mar-
kets) have a comparatively small impact. Note further that the sign of the
impact depends on the sign of fij.B e c a u s efii > 0 (see Appendix 2), each
country has a positive impact on itself. Stated diﬀerently, when country i is
8Note that, because φij = τ
1−σ
ij ,i ti sd i ﬃcult to strictly isolate the impact of geography
per se. This is because τij may include tariﬀsa n dd i ﬀerent non-tariﬀ barriers to trade,
which are not related to geography per se, and because σ is a parameter of the utility
function. Yet, if we consider that trade costs are approximated by distance (see Appendix
1), the ‘geographical interpretation’ remains plausible.
21centrally located (i.e. low value of ϕi), it tends to attract a large share of the
industry. Yet, being closely located to other countries with high values of
ϕj decreases λi signiﬁcantly when the coeﬃcient fij is negative. Note that
such an interaction, which we could refer to as a ‘hub shadow’ and which
captures the competition eﬀect, may explain why transportation hubs are
suﬃciently widely spaced in a spatial economy.9
Deﬁnitions (39) and (40) of the hub eﬀect in terms of the freeness of
trade only are slightly at odds with the deﬁnition of the hub eﬀect usually
used in economic geography. Indeed, according to Baldwin et al. (2003,
pp. 331), the hub eﬀect is that “superior market access favours the hub as
a location of industry...”. One should note that “superior market access”
depends on both geography (i.e. Φ) and demand (i.e. θ). This is also clear
in the three-country cased studied by Krugman (1993, p. 37), who argues
that when region 1 is more centrally located such that φ12 = φ13 > φ23,“ [ i f ]
production had instead been localized at 2, of course, then trade would have
ﬂowed along the other sides of the triangle — and 2 would be the hub. So,
the position of a hub can be self-fulﬁlling, determined by history”.
Following a well established tradition in gravity and trade theory (see
Head and Mayer, 2004, for a survey), the market access net of the compe-
tition eﬀect can be measured with the help of the nominal market potential
(henceforth, NMP). Let ˜ dij = dijP1−σ
j be the demand for country i’s vari-
eties in country j when we do not correct for the price index. The NMP of








or, in matrix notation, NMP = Φθ.10 All things equal, i.e. by abstracting
from price competition, regions that oﬀe rah i g hN M Pa l s oh o s tal a r g e r
9Fujita and Thisse (2002, p. 363) refer to such a phenomenon as urban shadow.T h e
existence of such a shadow yields many counterintuitive results. For example, improving
a country’s access to the other countries may lead to either inﬂow or outﬂow of industry,
depending crucially on the access of the other countries.
10The NMP, and similar measures, are often used in empirical applications (see, e.g.,
Davis and Weinstein, 2003). One can show that the nominal market potential belongs
to Weibull’s (1976) class of “attraction-accessibility measures”, of whom the gravity po-
tentials used in spatial interaction theory are a special instance. Although such measures
are relatively easy to implement operationally, their main drawback is to abstract from
competition eﬀects, which should play a central role in trade theory and economic geogra-
phy. Indeed, the diﬀerent trade costs are interrelated through general equilibrium network
feedbacks, so that decreasing trade costs can translate into decreasing real market poten-
tial. Note that such “weird” behavior is reminiscent of the well-known Braess-paradox in
transportation science.
22share of industry. Though theoretically appealing, the NMP is a rather bad
proxy for industry share. In particular, it is easy to ﬁnd examples in which
NMPi < NMPj but λ∗
i > λ∗
j.I nf a c t ,w h e nθ =( 1 /2,1/4,1/4) in example
(28), we get NMP2 < NMP3 but λ∗
2 > λ∗
3. This shows that having good
access to demand is not necessarily a locational advantage for the industry,
because losses due to competition may more than outweigh the gains due to
ah i g h e rN M P . Hence, any general analysis of the hub eﬀect turns out to be
complicated, because of indirect feedbacks in the network economy.
Following Head and Mayer (2004), the RMP is equal to NMP adjusted





which shows that the competition eﬀect my be captured by Φdiag(ϕi/θi)Φ−1.
If price competition was equalized across regions, RMP = k(NMP) should
hold, where k>0 is an arbitrary constant. In such a case, nominal market
potential could be used as a perfect proxy for real market potential. Yet,
this clearly only holds when diag(ϕi/θi)=kId,i . e .w h e n
ϕi
θi
= k>1, ∀i, (42)
where the last inequality is from (16). Note that (42) can be seen as being
a “constant competition isocurve”. Any increase in country i’s accessibility
to markets (i.e. a smaller value of ϕi) must be accompanied by a decrease
in its expenditure share θi in order for the degree of competition in country
i to remain the same in equilibrium.
5.2 Disentangling market size and geography
As argued in Section 4, the market size eﬀect can be measured by sterilizing
the impact of geography. Using expression (38), we readily have
λsize
i =






The common average freeness of trade φ across countries can be choosen
















One should note that expression (43) does not depend on θj for j 6= i.S t a t e d
diﬀerently, the way the remaining expenditure share 1 − θi is distributed
across countries does not matter. This shows that the case with symmetric
trade costs can be seen as a “country i vs. the rest of the world” scenario.11
The hub eﬀect can be measured analogously to the market size eﬀect by
sterilizing the impact of expenditure, i.e. by expression (40). We may say
that the diﬀerence λsize − θ is purely attributable to the market size eﬀect,
whereas the diﬀerence λhub − θ is purely attributable to the hub eﬀect.
If these two eﬀects were the only ones at work in the space-economy, the
following relation should hold:









As one can check, such a decomposition does not hold, which suggests that
more eﬀects than the market size eﬀe c ta n dt h eh u be ﬀect play a role. Let
us hence consider the following decomposition:









where ² is the residual which captures potential mis-speciﬁcations, the role
of factor endowments, and the competition eﬀect.12 It is the part of the
industry share of country i that is not explained by either the market size
eﬀect or the hub eﬀect. Note that the decomposition (44) may be used
for empirical analysis. Let i =1 ,2,...,M be the subscript for countries
and j =1 ,2,...,N be the subscript for industries, which then suggests the
following industry-level regression equation:
λ∗
ij = αi + βj +S I Z E ( φ,θij,M) + HUB(Φi,M)+²ij,
11This result is a by-product of the homothetic preferences in the CES speciﬁcation.
Indeed, when preferences are non-homothetic (as, e.g., in the quadratic-linear model by
Ottaviano et al., 2002), the equilibrium industry share λ
∗
i of country i depends on the
whole distribution θ−i of the industry across the remaining countries.
12The residual is very important if we interpret it as the “price competition” eﬀect.
Indeed, the Dixit-Stiglitz CES model has been criticized for abstracting from direct price
competition eﬀects (see, e.g., Lai and Treﬂer, 2002). If the residual is small, the price
competition eﬀect is not crucial and DS monopolistic competition oﬀers a fairly good ap-
proximation. Yet, if the residual is large, the price competition eﬀect may be important,
which thus may suggest that DS monopolistic competition oﬀers a fairly bad approxima-
tion.
24or the following country-level regression equation:
λ∗
i = αi +S I Z E ( φ,θi,M) + HUB(Φi,M)+²i, (45)
with θi =
P
jθij,a n dw h e r eαi and βj are country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Note that equation (45) does not depend on θj for j 6= i. Because λ∗ =
Φ−1diag(ϕ)−1θ, and because
λsize =









the following decomposition holds:13
λ∗ =
1 − φ
1+( M − 1)φ
Φ−1diag(ϕ)−1λsize +
Mφ
1+( M − 1)φ
λhub. (46)
Note that expression (46) appears to be especially appealing for empirical
purposes. Indeed, to see this rewrite it as follows:
λ∗ = β1Wλsize + β2λhub (47)
Because W ≡ Φ−1diag(ϕ)−1 depends on the freeness of trade only, it can
be interpreted in terms of spatial weight matrix, capturing the interactions
between regional market sizes. Although our speciﬁcation is not really a
spatial autoregressive one, it has clearly some common features. Further,
the theoretical model tells us that β1 ∈ (0,1), β2 ∈ (0,1) and β1 + β2 =1
should hold. Stated diﬀerently, the equilibrium industry distribution λ∗ is a
convex combination of spatially discounted market sizes and the hub eﬀect.
Whereas the ﬁrst term hence captures the ‘gravity part’ of the model, the
second term has not been really used until now in applied work.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have started with what we called the ‘Davis-Weinstein conjecture’ (Davis
and Weinstein, 2003). According to this conjecture, the HME uncovered in
13Note that λ
size may be rewritten as:
λ









which is reminiscent of the estimating equation (3) by Davis and Weinstein (2003, p. 7).
The ﬁrst term stands for the autarky share of industry, whereas the second term captures
the idiosyncratic component of local demand. Note, however, that the coeﬃcient capturing
the idiosyncratic impact Mφ/(1 − φ), though positive, need not be larger than one in
theory.
25two-country models may be extended to a multi-country world in a fairly
straightforward way. Speciﬁcally, with two countries, ﬁrms are dispropor-
tionately located in the country oﬀering larger local demand. With many
countries, the same should happen with respect to some index of local ‘eﬀec-
tive’ demand. Such index should take into account not only local demand
but also demands from other countries, possibly weighted by distance.
By developing a multi-country model à la Krugman (1980), we have
shown that things are not that simple. In particular, as shown by Proposi-
tion 3, it is quite diﬃcult, maybe impossible, to build an index of ‘eﬀective’
demand whose changes always generate disproportionate responses in out-
put. The reason being that, with many countries, the location of ﬁr m si sd e -
termined by the interaction between spatial (‘accessibility’) and non-spatial
(‘attraction’) eﬀects, which are crucially inﬂuenced by what happens to the
entire distribution across all countries (‘third country eﬀects’). These con-
ceptual diﬃculties do, however, not imply the impossibility of assessing the
role of product diﬀerentiation and market structure in shaping the structure
of world trade. We propose, indeed, a new theory-based estimating equation
that looks much like a spatial autoregressive model. The next logical step is
to take this new speciﬁcation to the data in order to see whether the results
conform to the predictions derived from the theory. We keep this part for
future work.
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Appendix 1: Factor price equalization
Factor price equalization requires any M −1 dimensional subset of coun-
tries to be unable to satisfy world demand for the homogenous good H (see,
e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003). Let `i be the amount of labor employed by a rep-
resentative ﬁrm in country i. For the homogenous production to take place
everywhere, the total mass of workers in each country should be greater
than total labor requirement in the modern sector, i.e.,
Li >n i`i ∀i.



























Thus, the manufacturing expenditure share µ must be small enough for the
homogenous good to be produced everywhere. In what follows, we assume
that condition (48) always holds.
Appendix 2: Positive deﬁniteness of Φ
In order for expressions (17) and (18) to be deﬁned, the trade cost matrix
Φ must be invertible. In this appendix, we derive suﬃcient conditions for
this to hold. We especially show that Φ is positive deﬁnite for the empirically
meaningful case in which distance is measured by the euclidian norm. Our
ﬁrst lemma provides a characterization of the iceberg trade cost in terms of
the exponential function.
29Lemma 1 Assume that r is a metric. Let rij = r(i,j) be the distance
between countries i and j,a n dl e tφ(i,j)=φij be the associated freeness of
trade. When trade costs are of the iceberg form, the relationship
φ ≡ e−r (49)
must hold.
Proof. Consider three countries i, j and k and let rik = rij +rjk,w h e r e
rik is the distance between i and k.B yd e ﬁnition of the iceberg trade cost, if
one unit of the good is shipped from country i, only a fraction 1/τij arrives
in country j, whereas only a fraction (1/τij)(1/τjk) arrives in country k.
That is, τik = τijτjk holds for any i, j and k. Since trade costs depend on
distance, i.e. τik = τ(rik), it must be that
τ(rij + rjk)=τ(rij)τ(rjk) ∀rij,r jk. (50)
Fix rjk,d i ﬀerentiate (50) with respect to rij and evaluate it at rij =0 .T h i s
yields the condition τ0(rjk)=τ0(0)τ(rjk). Solving this diﬀerential equation
with the condition τ(0) = 1 yields
τ(rjk) ≡ τjk = eτ0(0)rjk
Because φjk = τ1−σ
jk ,w eﬁnally obtain
φjk = e−τ0rjk,
where τ0 =( σ − 1)τ0(0) > 0 which can be normalized to 1 by an appropriate
choice of units for the metric r.14
Observe that (49) ensures that trade costs between any two countries are
pairwise symmetric (i.e. τij = τji or φij = φji) and that direct trade costs
between i and k do not exceed trade costs via a third country j (τik ≤ τijτjk
or φik ≥ φijφjk, due to the triangle inequality of the metric r).
Lemma 1 allows us to establish the following:
Lemma 2 Assume that r is the euclidian norm and that all countries are
distinct. Given (49), Φ is then positive deﬁnite.
14Note that if τik = τij +τjk for any i, j and k,w eh a v eτ(rij +rjk)=τ(rij)+τ(rjk),
which yields the linear trade costs τ(rjk)=τ
0(0)rjk as in Ottaviano et al. (2002).
30Proof. See theorems 3’ and 6’ in Schoenberg (1938).
Appendix 3: Local stability of interior equilibria








=1 ,i =1 ,2,...M. (51)
Let








be the diﬀerence in market potential between countries i and l. Consider the
relocation of an (inﬁnitesimal) mass of ﬁrms from country l to country i,s o
that λ∗
i changes to λ∗
i +d λi,w h e r e a sλ∗
l changes to λ∗
l − dλi,w i t hdλi > 0.






(λ)dλj + ²(dλ), (52)
where ²(dλ) is an error term that is negligible when kdλk is small. Because























The strict inequality holds because countries i and l are distinct such that
φij = φlj cannot hold for all j. We conclude that any ﬁrm migrating from l to
i necessarily decreases its real market potential, and hence proﬁts, implying
that any interior equilibrium is locally stable.
31A p p e n d i x4 :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Denote by φi the i- t hc o l u m nv e c t o ro fΦ,b yφ−1
j the j- t hc o l u m nv e c t o r
of its inverse Φ−1,b yhx,yi ≡ xTy the euclidian scalar product, and by kxk
the euclidian norm of x. Because Φ and Φ−1 are symmetric, by deﬁnition
hφi,φ−1
j i =0for all j 6= i and hφi,φ−1
i i =1 .
Assume that trade is suﬃciently free so that φi ≡ 1+tiξi,w h e r eξi ∈RM
+
is a perturbation vector and ti 6=0is a coeﬃcient such that φi > 1.N o t e
that ktiξik → 0 when ti → 0, which implies that the perturbation can always
be made suﬃciently small with the help of ti. N o t ea l s ot h a ti ti sa l w a y s
possible to choose the M vectors ξi such that the M vectors φi are linearly
independent. We know from condition (16) that at any interior equilibrium
ϕj ≡ hφ−1
j ,1i > θj must hold. Hence,
hφi,φ−1
j i = h1 + tiξi,φ−1
j i = h1,φ−1




j i = −tihξi,φ−1
j i > θj > 0
must hold. Because θj > 0 is ﬁxed, we can always ﬁnd ti → 0 suﬃciently
small such that this condition is violated (we can choose ti either positive or
negative, depending on the sign of hξi,φ−1
j i). We may hence conclude that
there is no interior equilibrium no matter the value of θ ∈ ri(∆) when trade
becomes suﬃciently free.
When trade is prohibitive, Φ = Φ−1 = Id so that a proportionate equi-
librium λ∗ = θ prevails from (18). Let φi = ei + ti1,w h e r eei is the i-th
vector of the canonical basis of RM and where ti is deﬁned as before. Again,
at any interior equilibrium ϕj ≡ hφ−1
j ,1i > θj must hold. We have
hφi,φ−1
j i = hei + ti1,φ−1
j i = hei,φ−1








j i > θj > 0
must hold. Because θj > 0 is ﬁxed, we can always ﬁnd ti → 0 suﬃciently
small such that this condition is satisﬁed (we can choose ti either positive
or negative, depending on the sign of hei,φ−1
j i). We may hence conclude
that there is always an interior equilibrium no matter the value of θ ∈ ri(∆)
when trade is suﬃciently restricted.
32Appendix 5: Existence of the direct DHME
We assume that the distance between countries is measured by the euclid-
ian norm. Hence, by Lemma 2 the trade cost matrix Φ is positive deﬁnite.
Because the inverse of a positive deﬁnite matrix is positive deﬁnite, and be-
cause each principal minor of a positive deﬁnite matrix is strictly positive,
we know that
fii > 0,i =1 ,2,...M. (53)
This allows us to establish the following.
































































The strict inequality is due to the fact that λ∗ is an interior solution, whereas
the last inequality is due to Fischer’s inequality (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson,
1985, p. 478).
33Appendix 6: A connection with location theory
In this appendix, we oﬀer an alternative interpretation of the condition
θi ≥ φ−1 maxj{θj} for market i to be dominant when trade costs are pairwise










τ if x 6= ai
0i fx = ai
is the binary metric (see, e.g., Wesolowsky, 1993, for an overview of the
Fermat-Weber problem), and where θ ∈ ri(∆).
Lemma 4 In the Fermat-Weber problem with the binary metric, there exists
an index i such that
ai ∈ argmin
x T(x).







θi ∀j =1 ,2,...M
because θj > 0 for all j. Hence, x cannot be an optimal solution.
Hence, the optimal location coincides with one of the markets ai.




{θj} ⇔ ai ∈ argmin
x T(x). (55)
Proof. Assume that θi ≥ maxj {θj} and suppose that ai / ∈ argminx T(x).








which implies that θk − θi > 0, a contradiction. Conversely, assume that







θj k =1 ,...M
34which implies that
θk − θi ≤ 0 k =1 ,...,M
a contradiction.
Because φ−1 > 1, we conclude that when i is a dominant market in
the HME model, it is also a dominant market in the corresponding Fermat-
Weber location problem. This is because





Note that the reverse does not hold, yet oﬀers a fairly good approximation
when trade becomes suﬃciently free (i.e. when φ ≈ 1). It is of interest to
note that because φ ≡ τ1−σ, this also holds when σ → 1,i . e .w h e nv a r i e t i e s
become independent. In both cases, the result stems from the fact that the
distortion due to price competition in segmented markets no longer plays
a role when either trade becomes suﬃciently free or when varieties become
suﬃciently independent. In the limit, when there are no more trade costs or
when varieties are independent, price competition is the same everywhere
so that location decisions are solely driven by considerations of market size,
just as in the Fermat-Weber problem.
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